Ecology

Ekologija

What caused the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon?

 

Što je uzrokovalo eksploziju na Deepwater Horizonu?

 

Deepwater Horizon was an exploratory rig

 

Deepwater Horizon bila je istraživačka platforma

 

The well was not plugged before removing dense drilling mud

 

Bušotina nije bila začepljena prije uklanjanja guste bušaće isplake (blata)

 

New chemical cement made by Halliburton was not tested properly

 

Novi kemijski cement kojeg je izumio Halliburton nije bio dovoljno testiran

 

The day when a 240-foot geyser erupted onto the rig

 

Dan kada je 80 metara visok gejzir izbio na platformu

 

Deregulation of the oil industry under the Bush government

 

Deregulacija naftne industrije za vrijeme Bushove vlade

 

Deepwater Horizon technical characteristics

 

Tehničke karakteristike Deepwater Horizona

 

Dr Steven Chu and a team of 150 US scientists are monitoring BP

 

Dr Steven Chu i tim od 150 američkih znanstvenika nadgledaju BP

 

What caused the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon?

As more details emerge about the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, which killed 11 workers and spilled millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, it has become clear that the single-minded drive for profit and a total lack of regulation created the disaster. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, oil giant BP, rig operator Transocean and the Obama administration all took the position that the disaster was an unforeseeable event. Interviews with workers, information gathered by researchers and testimony given to Congressional and Coast Guard hearings prove, however, that there was in fact ample warning that a disaster was possible, even likely. But BP and its partners, Transocean and Halliburton, disregarded these warnings.

They could do so with impunity. There exists no regulatory body in the oil industry to defend the safety interests of workers and the environment, the Mineral Management Service (MMS) of the Department of the Interior having long ago ceded all meaningful regulatory control to the industry itself.

Evidence revealed in...

Što je uzrokovalo eksploziju na Deepwater Horizonu?

Kako se pojavljuje sve više detalja o eksploziji i potapanju Deepwater Horizona, koje je ubilo 11 radnika i prolilo milijune galona nafte u Meksički zaljev, postalo je jasno da su usmjerenost prema jednom cilju - profitu i potpuni nedostatak propisa uzrokovali katastrofu. Neposredno nakon eksplozije, naftni div BP, operater platformi Transocean i Obamina vlada svi su zauzeli stajalište da je katastrofa bila nepredvidiv događaj. Razgovori s radnicima, informacije prikupljene od strane istraživača i svjedočenja pred Kongresom i Obalnom stražom pokazuju, međutim, da je u stvari bilo i više nego dovoljno upozorenja da je katastrofa moguća, čak i vjerojatna. No BP i njegovi partneri, Transocean i Halliburton, zanemarili su ta upozorenja.

Oni su to mogli učiniti nekažnjeno. Ne postoji regulatorno tijelo u naftnoj industriji koje bi branilo sigurnosne interese radnika i okoliša, a Služba za upravljanje rudama (MMS) iz Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova već je davno prepustila sve smislene regulatorne kontrole samoj industriji.

Dokazi otkriveni u...

Deepwater Horizon was an exploratory rig

Deepwater Horizon was not an extractive oil rig, but an exploratory rig. When it exploded on April 20 it was in the process of completing its exploration by capping the well it had bored some three miles below the ocean floor, before moving on to another exploration site. This required the rig to plug the oil well and separate its riser piping from the wellhead to the rig. A separate rig would later have come to access the sealed wellhead.


Deepwater Horizon's exploratory drilling had been troubled by unusually frequent and forceful contact with explosive natural gas deposits. Only weeks before the fatal explosion, so much gas forced its way up the well bore and onto the rig platform that an emergency freeze was placed on many activities aboard the rig in order to avoid triggering an explosion.

According to one worker's report, submitted to Bea, "at one point during the previous several weeks, so much gas came belching up to the surface that a loudspeaker announcement called for a halt to all hot work", meaning any smoking, welding, cooking or any other use of fire.

"As the job unfolded, the workers did have intermittent trouble...

Deepwater Horizon bila je istraživačka platforma

Deepwater Horizon nije bila eksploatacijska naftna platforma, nego istraživačka platforma. Kada je eksplodirala 20. travnja, bila je u procesu završavanja svojih istraživanja stavljajući čep na bušotinu koju je izbušila oko tri milje ispod oceanskog dna, prije prelaska na drugu lokaciju za istraživanje. To je zahtijevalo da platforma začepi izvor nafte i odvoji svoje cijevi od izvora do same platforme. Kasnije bi došla zasebna platforma kako bi pristupila začepljenom izvoru.

Istraživačko bušenje Deepwater Horizona imalo je problema s neobično čestim i snažnim kontaktima s eksplozivnim prirodnim nalazištima plina. Samo nekoliko tjedana prije kobne eksplozije, toliko je mnogo plina uspjelo na silu ući kroz cijev na naftnu platformu da su zaustavljene sve aktivnosti na platformi u cilju izbjegavanja eksplozije.

Prema izvješću jednog radnika, koje je predano profesoru Bei, "u jednom trenutku tijekom prethodnih nekoliko tjedana, toliko se mnogo plina počelo izbacivati na površinu da je najava putem zvučnika pozvala da se prekinu svi vrući radovi", što znači pušenje, varenje, kuhanje ili bilo kakva druga uporaba vatre.

"Kako se posao odvijao, radnici su povremeno imali problema...

The well was not plugged before removing dense drilling mud

The day of the explosion, engineers reportedly argued over whether or not to remove dense drilling mud from the well bore, replacing it with much lighter sea water. Normally this step is taken only after a second cement plug is hardened in the piping, a process that takes several hours. Until this plug is fully installed, heavy mud is the first line of defense against surging of oil and natural gas up the bore to the rig platform.

The decision was taken to replace the mud before plugging the well, even though this would increase the chances of an explosion—and even though the operation failed a critical pressure test the same day, BP and Transocean executives admitted to the House Energy Committee. This clearly reckless decision to press forward was very likely done to protect BP's profit interests, both because it paid rig owner Transocean an estimated $500,000 per day for use of Deepwater Horizon and its crew, and because it was anxious to bring the new well into active production.


A worker told the Wall Street Journal that the crew was in fact preparing to drop the cement plug down the riser—standard procedure—when the order came to instead...

Bušotina nije bila začepljena prije uklanjanja guste bušaće isplake (blata)

Na dan eksplozije, inženjeri su navodno raspravljali da li ukloniti ili ne gustu bušaću isplaku (blato) iz kanala bušotine i zamijeniti ju s mnogo lakšom morskom vodom. Obično se taj korak poduzima tek nakon što se drugi čep od cementa stvrdne u cijevima, što je proces koji traje nekoliko sati. Sve dok taj čep nije u potpunosti postavljen, teško blato je prva linija obrane protiv navale nafte i prirodnog plina uz kanal bušotine do same platforme.

Donesena je odluka da se zamijeni blato prije začepljivanja bušotine, iako bi to povećalo šanse za eksploziju - i to unatoč tome što operacija nije uspjela izdržati granični tlak na ispitivanju isti dan, rukovoditelji BP-a i Transoceana priznali su Povjerenstvu za energetiku u kućanstvima. Ova očito nerazborita odluka da se na silu ide naprijed je vrlo vjerojatno donesena kako bi se zaštitili BP-ovi interesi profita, zbog toga što je tvrtka plaćala vlasniku platforme Transoceanu otprilike 500.000 dolara dnevno za korištenje Deepwater Horizona i njegove posade, a i zbog toga što nije mogla dočekati da se nova bušotina stavi u aktivnu proizvodnju.

Jedan radnik je rekao Wall Street Journalu da se posada zapravo pripremala ubaciti cementni čep niz cijev - standardni postupak - kada je došla naredba da se umjesto toga...

New chemical cement made by Halliburton was not tested properly

Halliburton, which contracted for the cement and mudding work on the rig, had deployed a new chemical cement that it said would be resistant to structural damage caused by methane hydrates, which were present in the undersea rock in high quantities. But Bea, an expert with decades of experience in oil extraction engineering, said that when he saw the formula for Halliburton's cement, he said "Uh."

Bea told that Halliburton had produced "many excellent papers" that claim "because of the chemicals they've added, they think the cement can cure rapidly." But Bea explained that the same chemicals they added likely gave off too much heat, thus thawing gases lodged in the rocks from their methane hydrate form and sending them up the bore and riser. When the cement failed, gas began to force its way up the riser. At this point, concrete well plugs in the pipe should have blocked the gas. But contrary to...

Novi kemijski cement kojeg je izumio Halliburton nije bio dovoljno testiran

Halliburton, koji je imao ugovor za radove s cementom i blatom na platformi, koristio je novi kemijski cement za kojeg je rekao da je otporan na strukturalna oštećenja koja nastaju zbog metan hidrata, koji su u velikim količinama prisutni u stijenama ispod dna oceana. Ali Bea, stručnjak s desetljećima iskustva u inženjerstvu vađenja nafte, rekao je "uh", kada je vidio formulu za Halliburtonov cement.

Bea je rekao da je Halliburton proizveo "mnogo izvrsnih dokumenata" koji tvrde da "zbog kemikalija koje su dodali, misle da se cement može brzo zaliječiti." Ali Bea je objasnio da su iste te kemikalije koje su dodali vjerojatno davale previše topline, tako otapajući plinove nataložene u stijenama iz njihovog metan-hidrat oblika i šaljući ih prema gore uz svrdlo i cijev. Kada je cement zakazao, plin je na silu započeo svoj put prema gore uz cijev. U ovom trenutku, betonski čepovi u cijevi bi blokirali plin. No suprotno...

The day when a 240-foot geyser erupted onto the rig

On the evening of April 20, a geyser of seawater erupted onto the rig, shooting 240 feet into the air. This was soon followed by the eruption of a slushy combination of mud, gas and water. At this point workers knew they were in danger because the mud could only have come from 10,000 feet down, Bea said. On the rig, the gas component of the slushy material quickly transitioned into a fully gaseous state and then ignited into a series of explosions and then a firestorm. Workers immediately attempted to activate the blowout preventer, but it too failed. Ironically, at the moment of the explosion a number of BP officials, recently helicoptered to the rig, had gathered for a celebration with rig staff marking seven years of a "spotless" safety record. Those at the party were thrown violently to the floor by the force of the explosion.

Bea, who headed up an independent team of scientists that investigated failure of levees during Hurricane Katrina, compared the two events. "For me, the tragedy of Katrina was...

Dan kada je 80 metara visok gejzir izbio na platformu

Navečer 20. travnja, gejzir morske vode je izbio na platformu, i letio 240 stopa (80 metara) u visinu. Uskoro je uslijedila erupcija bljuzgave kombinacije blata, plina i vode. U ovom trenutku radnici su znali da su u opasnosti jer je blato moglo doći samo iz dubine od 3.000 metara, rekao je Bea. Na platformi, plinovita komponenta bljuzgavog materijala ubrzo se pretvorila u potpuno plinovito stanje a zatim zapalila u slijed eksplozija te zatim vatrenu oluju. Radnici su odmah pokušali aktivirati protuerupcijski uređaj, ali i on je zakazao. Ironično, u trenutku eksplozije brojni dužnosnici BP-a, koji su prije toga sletjeli helikopterom na platformu, okupili su se kako bi s osobljem proslavili obilježavanje sedam godina sigurnosnog rekorda "bez i jedne mrlje". Oni koji su bili na zabavi su nasilno odbačeni na pod zbog snage eksplozije.

Bea, koji je vodio neovisan tim znanstvenika koji je ispitivao zakazivanje nasipa tijekom uragana Katrina, usporedio je dva događaja. "Za mene, tragedija Katrine bila su...

Deregulation of the oil industry under the Bush government

The series of mechanical failures and human errors that conspired to produce the disaster aboard the Deepwater Horizon were not random accidents, as the Obama administration and much of the media seek to portray them. They arose from the deregulation of the oil industry that has advanced for decades under both Republican and Democratic administrations. These conditions made a major spill inevitable— if not on the Deepwater Horizon, then on some other rig. Indeed, thousands of oil rigs operating under precisely the same regulatory environment that produced the Deepwater Horizon disaster continue to extract oil even today. The Deepwater Horizon, it has become clear, was operated in the total absence of real government regulation. This is most evident in relationship to the rig's blowout preventer, its final line of defense.

Frank Patton, who had given BP authorization to begin drilling at the Deepwater Horizon site, admitted that he had performed no inquiry and had been given no assurance that the rig's blowout preventer would function in the event of a spill. He also admitted that he had certified "hundreds" of oil rigs without verifying the efficacy of their blowout preventers. These rigs presumably continue to operate in Gulf waters—a lot deeper water than the Deepwater Horizon.


The head of Transocean...

Deregulacija naftne industrije za vrijeme Bushove vlade

Niz mehaničkih kvarova i ljudskih pogrešaka koje su se urotile kako bi proizvele katastrofu na Deepwater Horizonu nisu bile slučajne nesreće, kako to Obamina vlada i većina medija žele prikazati. Oni su nastali zbog deregulacije naftne industrije koja je napredovala desetljećima u sklopu republikanskih kao i demokratskih uprava. Ovi uvjeti su učinili da veliko izlijevanje nafte bude neizbježno — ako već ne na Deepwater Horizonu, onda na nekoj drugoj platformi. Doista, tisuće naftnih platformi koje rade u sklopu istog regulatornog okruženja koje je proizvelo katastrofu na Deepwater Horizonu čak i danas nastavlja crpiti naftu. Deepwater Horizon, postalo je jasno, funkcionirao je u potpunoj odsutnosti stvarne regulacije od strane vlade. To je najočitije glede protuerupcijskog uređaja na platformi, njene konačne linije obrane.

Frank Patton, koji je dao BP-u ovlaštenje za početak bušenja na lokaciji Deepwater Horizona, priznao je da nije izvršio nikakav upit i da mu nisu dana nikakva jamstva da će protuerupcijski uređaj funkcionirati u slučaju izlijevanja. Također je priznao da je dao odobrenje "stotinama" naftnih platformi bez provjere djelotvornosti njihovih protuerupcijskih uređaja. Ove platforme vjerojatno i dalje rade u vodama Zaljeva — puno dubljim vodama od Deepwater Horizona.

Direktor Transoceana...

Deepwater Horizon technical characteristics

Name: Deepwater Horizon
Owner: Transocean
Operator: Transocean
Port of registry: Majuro, Marshall Islands
Route: Gulf of Mexico
Ordered: December 1998
Builder: Hyundai Heavy Industries
Cost: US$560 million
Way number: 89
Laid down: March 21, 2000
Completed: 2001
Acquired: February 23, 2001
Maiden voyage: Ulsan, South Korea – Freeport, Texas
Out of service: April 21, 2010 (exploded)
Identification: IMO Number 8764597, Call V7HC9
Fate: Destroyed
Status: Sunk

Class and type: ABS +A1 DPS-3 Column Stabilized MODU
Tonnage: 32,588 tonnes
Displacement: 52,587 tonnes
Length: 112 m
Beam: 78 m
Height: 97.4 m
Draught: 23.0 m
Depth: 41.5 m
Installed power: 42 MW
Propulsion: Diesel electric
Speed: 4 kts
Crew: 146
Notes: 8202 tonne Variable Deck Load, DP Class 3, 8 thrusters, 10,000 ft drilling water depth

Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, semi-submersible offshore drilling rig. The rig was built in 2001 in South Korea, is owned by Transocean and was leased to BP plc until September 2013. Deepwater Horizon was registered in Majuro...

Tehničke karakteristike Deepwater Horizona

Ime: Deepwater Horizon
Vlasnik: Transocean
Operater: Transocean
Luka registracije: Majuro, Maršalovi Otoci
Ruta: Meksički zaljev
Naručena: Prosinac, 1998. godine
Graditelj: Hyundai Heavy Industries
Cijena: 560 milijuna dolara
Broj puta: 89
Postavljena: 21. ožujka 2000. godine
Završena: 2001. godine
Preuzeta: 23. veljače 2001. godine
Prvo putovanje: Ulsan, Južna Koreja – Freeport, Texas
Izvan službe: 21. travnja 2010. godine (eksplodirala)
Identifikacija: IMO Broj 8764597, Naziv V7HC9
Sudbina: Uništena
Status: Potopljena

Klasa i tip: ABS-A1 DPS-3 stabilizirana stupovima MODU
Tonaža: 32.588 tona
Otklon: 52.587 tona
Dužina: 112 m
Greda: 78 m
Visina: 97.4 m
Gaz: 23.0 m
Dubina: 41.5 m
Ugrađena snaga: 42 MW
Pogon: Diesel-električni
Brzina: 4 čvora
Posada: 146
Zabilješke: 8202 tona varijabilno opterećenje palube, DP klasa 3, 8 potisnika, dubina bušenja vode 10.000 stopa (3.000 m)

Deepwater Horizon je bila ultra-dubinska, dinamički postavljena, polupotopiva morska platforma za bušenje. Platforma je izgrađena 2001. godine u Južnoj Koreji, u vlasništvu je Transoceana i bila je iznajmljena BP-u do rujna 2013. godine. Deepwater Horizon je registrirana u Majurou...

Dr Steven Chu and a team of 150 US scientists are monitoring BP

This is probably the biggest environmental disaster we've ever faced in this country. It's certainly the biggest oil spill, and we're responding with the biggest environmental response.

How much oil is coming out every day?

This is a hard question to answer. More oil is leaking into the Gulf of Mexico than at any other time in our history. There is more oil leaking than in the Exxon Valdez.

So what we did is we put together an independent government review panel to look at this. And here's why it's important to know that it's independent. BP has a financial interest in these numbers. They will pay penalties at the end of the day, a per barrel, per day penalty. So what we wanted was a group that didn't include BP. They looked at three issues to determine the flow rate. They looked at what was happening on the surface using satellite imagery. They looked at what had come up through the riser insertion, which has now been removed; and they also looked at the burn rate, and they looked at the oil and gas plume. And so based on those three groups--there were differences among the groups. That's how scientists are, they have differences. When they came back together, they put forth the number of between 12,000 and 19,000 barrels. They're going to continue to look at this. But if we...

Dr Steven Chu i tim od 150 američkih znanstvenika nadgledaju BP

Ovo je vjerojatno najveća ekološka katastrofa s kojom smo se ikada suočili u ovoj zemlji. Svakako je najveća naftna havarija, i mi odgovaramo najvećom ekološkom akcijom.


Koliko nafte istječe svaki dan?

Na to je pitanje teško odgovoriti. Više nafte istječe u Meksički zaljev nego u bilo kojem trenutku naše povijesti. Istječe više nafte nego u Exxon Valdezu.


Što smo zapravo učinili je da smo sastavili neovisnu vladinu revizorsku skupinu da se bavi ovim problemom. I evo razloga zašto je važno znati da je ta skupina neovisna. BP ima financijski interes u ovom pitanju. Platit će kazne na kraju svega, po barelu, po danu. Ono što smo željeli je skupinu koja ne uključuje BP. Skupina je pratila tri faktora kako bi odredila protok nafte. Gledali su što se događa na površini koristeći satelitske snimke. Gledali su što je izašlo kroz vertikalno umetnutu cijev, koja je sada uklonjena; i također su pratili stopu spaljivanja i mlaz nafte i plina. I tako na osnovi ove tri skupine - postojale su nesuglasice među njima. To je tako sa znanstvenicima, oni imaju nesuglasice. Kada su sve zajedno zbrojili, sastavili su brojku koja iznosi između 12.000 i 19.000 barela. Skupina će nastaviti pratiti ove faktore. Ali ako bismo...